Initiative, Organisation and Aims

From among the awkward tasks faced by researchers investigating the web of lies, insidiousness, greed and murder that constituted the pogrom in Iasi, the most delicate is that aimed at revealing the full truth concerning the initiative that sparked off this hell. The barbaric deeds committed in broad daylight or under the cover of darkness were seen, heard and felt by a community of more than one hundred thousand. Most members of this community - victims, murderers, thieves and onlookers - have survived the events and the years since then. We have an abundance of tales, which are usually similar. By evaluating them we can come up with a picture of the train of events during the pogrom not much removed from the truth.

The initiative, however, as well as the devilish plans were agreed upon behind padded and closed doors. Few people were members of the evil caucuses, and even fewer would like to unravel the truth today. Therefore, we cannot solely rely on the tangible world of facts and documentation; the truth must be extracted from the muddled confusion of assumptions, which are nevertheless underpinned by the evidence forced out of those who had tried to remain silent in vain.

[130]

Whether or not the Rumanian leadership was aware of this initiative is debatable, and if it was, then to what extent, neither do we know whether or not it agreed with it, and once again, if so, then to what extent. However, an order of general bearing containing one of the shameful directives issued by Ion Antonescu on June 19 seems to support the idea that he had been informed. This view is also backed up by the incessant anti-Semitic hatred expressed and propagated by the country's leaders during the first days of the war. Finally, this question is answered by their unreserved approval, which manifested itself in the mindless decrees issued by Ion Antonescu himself immediately following the bloodbaths on July 1 and 2, 1941.

For the civilised human being the aims of the organisers of the bloodbath are obscure and incomprehensible. If it is true that it had been organised by the Germans, then it would appear that they were aiming for a display of strength intended to generate fear and respect in Rumanian masses and leaders, and to maintain the inferiority complex which had been characteristic of Rumanian-German co-operation from the outset.

The Rumanian and German secret services and police had been entrusted with the preparation and organisation of the pogrom in Iasi. The SSI (Serviciul Special de Informatiuni - the Special Information Service), consisting of a network of secret agents and criminals, was considered to be especially capable of carrying out this task.

Rumanian reactionary forces had always made ample [131] use of the benefits provided to an oligarchic political system by a despised police force - especially during the period between the two world wars. The reputation for persecution of the Police Chief Administration, which had belonged to the Ministry of the Interior, the notorious Siguranta, will remain among those organisations of great renown, i.e. the Czarist Ochrana, the British Intelligence Service or the German Gestapo. For decades it suppressed all drives towards freedom and development with terror and torture, imprisoned working people and martyrs, who had fought for a better life. However, when the royal dictatorship started to interfere in the governing of the country, and especially when it openly seized power, the Siguranta, with its links to political parties, was no longer fit for the purposes of executive power. Therefore, the King decided to establish his own police force. At first, this was a small nucleus consisting of a tiny group of people led by the Palace Marshal, who slowly developed it further. This is how the Special Information Service (SSI), the police force involved in internal espionage, the activities of which were directed against politicians, communists and co-existing ethnic groups, came into existence.

Following the expulsion of Charles II, this weapon of terror, formerly the property of the royal dictatorship, was inherited by the fascist Iron Guard dictatorship. The Palace Marshal was watchful enough to retain it for himself. He gave the Iron Guard members a free hand in wreaking revenge, which culminated in the bloodbath in Jilava on November 17, 1940, during which, among others, the former heads of the SSI, Mihail Moruzov and Niky Stefanescu were assassinated. He even allowed them to establish their own [132] police force, the horrifying Iron Guard Police, an institution of torture, robbery and murder. He did not, however, allow his political friends to lay their hands on the SSI. Shortly after his inauguration on November 11, 1940, Antonescu attached the entire SSI system to his cabinet, and appointed one of his confidantes, Eugen Critescu, as its head, who proved very competent, and loyally served his master

The SSI network soon encompassed the capital and the provinces, and set up its foreign information service. In Bucharest a few hundred Jews were evicted from their flats to provide the SSI with an entire street inaccessible to strangers. A large number of senior officers were redeployed to the innumerable departments of the Special Service. In the provinces, agencies known as residencies were organized; their sphere of activities included the observation of Jews and communists, and the filing of names for use at an appropriate time in the future.

The activities of the SSI were also assisted by the Second Head Department of the General Command headed by Colonel Radu Dinulescu, as well as an enormous number of former Iron Guard members and informers, whose anti- Semitism would pass any test.

Either with or without the permission of the SSI, the General Command and the Siguranta Centre, another enormous espionage network, and secret police operated on Rumanian soil at the time: this belonged to the German Reich. The provision for impunity following acts of provocation and anarchy, and the intrusion of the so-called fifth column into every aspect of the political and economic [133] landscape were among the considerable achievements of German Secret Service activities, and especially those of the Gestapo.

Simultaneously with the arrival of German troops in the country, there was a proliferation of secret Nazi espionage organisations and military or political services in the autumn of 1940.

While the archives of the SSI remained untouched, files referring to the bloodbath in Iasi were immediately after August 23, or perhaps a little later, either hidden or destroyed. Only the files belonging to the Ministry of the Interior and the Gendarmerie General Inspectorate are at the disposal of history and justice. These files, however, contain only a few details about the course of events during the pogrom.

Therefore, the preparations for the pogrom in Iasi can be reconstructed only on the basis of evidence and individual testimonies collected by judicial bodies. However, these are also incomplete, since the testimonies of Germans and deceased Rumanians are missing. Also missing is the testimony of General von Schobert - who died in an aviation accident near Kiev; and the testimonies of Generals von Hauffe and Gerstenberg, who headed the German military mission in Rumania; no evidence was given by General von Salmuth, Commander of the XXX German Military Corps; nor by General von Roetig, Commander of the 198th Army Division; nor by Colonel Rodler, the Rumanian head of the Abwehr; nor by his right-hand man, Alexander von [134] Stransky; nor from Captain Hoffman, commander of the German garrison in Iasi; and absent above all others is the testimony of Baron Manfred von Killinger, German Ambassador to Bucharest. Similarly missing are the testimonies of certain Rumanian personalities, the most important of whom are: Becescu-Georgescu, the Director of the SSI - who died a few years ago; Major Emil Tulbure, representative of the SSI in Iasi, who died of a heart attack a few days after the pogrom; his assistant, Major Gheorghe Balotescu, who disappeared in Germany after August 23, 1944.

From the testimonies and documents at our disposal we can, nevertheless, pick out certain elements which enable us to reconstruct the prologue to the pogrom.

From these it turns out that before the start of military operations, upon the orders of Ion Antonescu and General Headquarters, the so-called SSI Mobile Detachment No. 1 was formed with the acknowledged aim of combating espionage, sabotage and terrorist actions, and with the secret aim of organising anti-espionage, -sabotage and -terrorist actions.

The detachment consisted of about 160 persons selected from among the most able, courageous and reliable people in the SSI. Among the members of the detachment were: Eugen Cristescu, the all-powerful director; his right-hand man, Colonel Ion Lisievici, Head of the Information Department; Lieutenant-Colonel Constantin Ionescu Micandru, Head of Department "G", which provided contact with the Germans; his inseparable shadow, the German Major Herman von Stransky; Lieutenant-Colonel Proca [135] Alexandru, Head of the Anti-Sabotage Department; Director Florin Becescu-Georgescu, Head of the Counter-Espionage Department. In addition to these people, members of the detachment included the bravest agents and group leaders: Gheorghe Critescu (brother of Eugen Critescu), Grigore Guta Petrovici, Teodor Rosianu (alias Relu Critescu) and many more.

The detachment set off in cars towards Bessarabia on June 18, 1941. Upon leaving, Director Florin Becescu-Georgescu took the preprepared charts and files indicating the geographical location of the Jewish population. After resting for short periods in Maia, near Snagov, and Vartejcoiu, near Odobesti, and somewhat longer periods in Vadu, near Piatra Neamt and Soprocesti, near Roman, the detachment arrived in Iasi.

Then they continued on their way leaving blood and ruins in their wake in Kishinew, Tighina, Tiraspol, Odessa, and all the way to Rostow.

Throughout the journey the detachment kept in constant contact with the various agencies and residencies, especially the one in Iasi. The heads of the residencies in Iasi, Majors Emil Tulbure and Gheorghe Balotescu, received instructions and commands telling them when to start work. It is not out of the question that the directives were forwarded by Colonel Lisievici, or Lieutenant-Colonel Proca, the head of the Anti-Sabotage Department. It is certain that plans and orders concerning the job were passed on to them by Lieutenant-Colonel Ionescu Micandru and Major Stransky, so that they could supervise events more closely. [136]

Major Stransky and Lieutenant-Colonel Ionescu Micandru hurried to Iasi on June 26, spent a few hours at the Headquarters of 14th Division, and then left the town in the evening disappearing mysteriously, probably heading for the village of Bucium, where the SSI Representatives were accommodated.

The Representatives were now able to report to their superiors that they had recruited, trained and armed about thirty or forty Iron Guards, who were staying in a flat rented by a lawyer in Florilor St. in the Pacurari quarter. As a matter of fact, they were found there the following day by Colonel Constantin Lupu, the garrison commander who - although he had arrived there as a result of a very serious complaint to the police - succumbed to orders coming from above, and would not in any way hinder them in the course of events to come.

They were also in a position to inform Lieutenant-Colonel Micandru that Iron Guard member Mircea Manoliu, who had been called up as a reserve lance-sergeant in the zone of the 13th Dorobanti Regiment, was given the task of carrying out blatant acts of terrorism in order to experiment on the reactions of the authorities who had not been informed of the preparations in advance. On the same night, Manoliu fired at three Jews killing only one; the following night he killed another six, and on Saturday morning he incited the Abattoir quarter to robbery, and the mob on the outskirts to atrocities.

[137] The organisers of the pogrom had no further reasons for indecision. By this stage, they could be sure of success, and only the final orders remained to be given.

The Iron Guard mercenaries were deployed to occupy various positions in every quarter of the town. They were well-equipped with low calibre weapons, Flaubert guns, and blank bullets, which were only meant to make noise. Many of them, however, possessed lethal weapons, and fired them without pity at the unfortunates who were trying in vain to hide.

The Teutonic brigades were also alerted, and they too set off, with some of them provoking, and others killing. Their patrols were ready to break into previously marked Jewish houses while giving the impression of being attacked. The crosses painted on houses and fences did not really interest them, because they knew that in this poisoned town they had the looting-hungry mob at their disposal, and that the mob would point out the houses to be attacked.

They also warned representatives of the authorities whom they had informed of their plot in time, and who issued their final instructions, e.g. Police Captain Leahu ordered police officers not to interfere with what the army was doing, irrespective of whether it was right or wrong.

From the headquarters of the Mobile Detachment, Major Gheorghe Balotescu summoned his close friend, "Inspector" Grigore Petrovici, who hurried to Iasi with his entire unit.

[138] Finally, one last instruction to the anti-aircraft defence service, that within the overall scheme of the pogrom their task was to sound false air-raid sirens twice, at set times.

Saturday, 9.30 p.m., June 28, 1941. The "H" hour!... One siren, one aircraft, one rocket. All hell broke loose.